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FLINT’S FIGHT FOR ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS
Noah D. Hall
ABSTRACT—This Essay reviews the recent development of environmental
rights within U.S. constitutional law, advanced through a series of federal
court decisions in the wake of the Flint water crisis. The residents of Flint
were poisoned and lied to by their government for nearly two years. They
experienced how American environmental governance has failed at the state
and federal levels and how our environmental laws leave individuals and
communities unprotected. And then Flint fought back, in the courts, for five
years. Flint residents have been overwhelmingly successful, achieving some
justice for themselves and advancing substantive rights and remedies within
our constitutional framework for all Americans. Their legal victories
established precedents for courts to use their equitable powers to order
systemic remedies to environmental injustices, protect the right to bodily
integrity—as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Substantive Due
Process Clause—against involuntary pollution and toxic exposure, and hold
the U.S. government accountable for inaction in administering our
environmental laws. Flint’s fight for environmental rights has turned the
Flint water crisis into a breakthrough event in environmental and
constitutional law.
AUTHOR—Professor of Law, Wayne State University Law School. With
gratitude to the students of the Northwestern University Law Review who
sponsored the 2021 Symposium, Reimagining Property in the Era
of Inequality.
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INTRODUCTION
In this Essay, I present the Flint water crisis as the outcome of both
specific state actions and broader failures of environmental law. The story
begins chronologically with the role of the State of Michigan, focusing on
state decisions from approximately 2011 to 2015 that culminated in the
delivery of drinking water without proper treatment to Flint residents. The
injustice of the Flint water crisis peaked during the final eighteen months of
this period under the federal Environmental Protection Agency’s
administration of the Safe Drinking Water Act. The failure of federal
environmental law and governance apparent in the Flint water crisis is
structural and systemic and a direct cause of ongoing environmental
injustices necessitating changes in policy and politics.
There are lessons to be learned from why and how Flint residents were
poisoned by their state and failed by the EPA. But the focus of this Essay is
not how Flint was victimized; it is how Flint has fought back successfully
and cleared new legal paths for environmental justice in the courts. Flint
residents have sought accountability for wrongs and vindication of rights in
an ongoing five-year legal campaign—and have been overwhelmingly
successful. Flint plaintiffs have won orders and opinions from federal courts
to require the state to deliver safe water to every Flint resident, to protect due
process and equal rights regardless of compliance with environmental laws,
to recognize a violation of the right to bodily integrity by the state for
providing unsafe water, and to recover damages from the EPA for its
negligent administration and enforcement of the Safe Drinking Water Act.
These are tremendous legal victories for advancing meaningful
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environmental rights in U.S. law, and potential precedents for many other
communities suffering from environmental injustice.
I am not an objective observer of the Flint water crisis or the legal fights
that followed. In 2016, I was appointed by then-Michigan Attorney General
Bill Schuette as Special Assistant Attorney General with the Office of
Special Counsel for the Flint water crisis, independent of the state, and
charged with investigating state officials along with all other responsible
parties.1 I was the lead attorney for the civil investigation and attorney of
record for the People on civil litigation.2 I also supported the work of Special
Prosecutor Todd Flood and the criminal investigation that led to criminal
charges against fifteen government officials.3 Attorney General Dana Nessel
ended both my appointment (apparently directing Solicitor General Fadwa
Hammoud to terminate me) and the independent Office of Special Counsel
in 2019 for various policy reasons, including a “desire to appoint in-house
‘career prosecutors’ to the cases.”4
Although all then-pending criminal charges relating to the Flint water
crisis filed during my appointment were dismissed under Attorney General

1
For more information, see Brad Devereaux, Environmental Attorney Noah Hall Joins AG Probe of
Flint Water Crisis, MLIVE (Mar. 16, 2016, 9:44 PM), https://www.mlive.com/news/2016/03/
enviromental_legal_expert_join.html [https://perma.cc/6VM2-3JH2]; Noah Hall, Appointment as Special
Assistant Attorney General for the Flint Water Investigation, GREAT LAKES L. (Mar. 2016),
https://www.greatlakeslaw.org/blog/2016/03/appointment-as-special-assistant-attorney-general-for-theflint-water-investigation.html [https://perma.cc/P2LP-QCRW].
2
For additional information about my role, see Schuette Files Civil Suit Against Veolia and LAN for
Role in Flint Water Poisoning, MICH. DEP’T OF ATT’Y GEN., https://perma.cc/Z94S-RJ5P.
3
For more information on this investigation, see Isabella Isaacs-Thomas, Flint Water Investigator
Calls for Independent Oversight of Michigan DEQ, MICH. RADIO (Jan. 8, 2019, 6:02 PM),
https://www.michiganradio.org/politics-government/2019-01-08/flint-water-investigator-calls-forindependent-oversight-of-michigan-deq [https://perma.cc/2FXE-J5FM].
4
Beth LeBlanc, Cloud of Flint Crisis Remains Hanging over Snyder, DETROIT NEWS (Mar. 19, 2019,
10:25
PM),
https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/local/michigan/2019/03/19/letter-snydersattorney-preceded-flint-lawyers-firing/3151650002/
[https://perma.cc/ZHA8-7GUQ]
(including
statements by Attorney General Nessel’s spokesman offering various reasons for terminating independent
counsel); see also Beth LeBlanc, Nessel’s Office Reviews Potential Conflict in Flint Water Civil Cases,
DETROIT NEWS (Feb. 27, 2019, 6:02 PM), https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/local/
michigan/2019/02/27/nessels-office-reviewing-potential-conflict-flint-civil-cases/2984613002/ [https://
perma.cc/52U4-2FPX]; AG Nessel Responds to Criticism of Decision to Remove Independent Counsel
from Flint Water Lawsuit, MICH. RADIO (Mar. 6, 2019, 6:09 PM), https://www.michiganradio.org/
politics-government/2019-03-06/ag-nessel-responds-to-criticism-of-decision-to-remove-independentcounsel-from-flint-water-lawsuit [https://perma.cc/8RGP-9FQ7]; Steve Carmody, Tracy Samilton &
Cheyna Roth, State Drops All Pending Flint Water Crisis Charges, Restarting Investigation, MICH.
RADIO (June 13, 2019, 4:08 PM), https://www.michiganradio.org/law/2019-06-13/state-drops-allpending-flint-water-crisis-charges-restarting-investigation [https://perma.cc/Q4PT-JUMA].
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Nessel on June 13, 2019,5 the prosecution filed new charges against many of
the same defendants (and the former governor).6 To be clear: A charge is
merely an accusation, and the defendants are presumed innocent until and
unless proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. In my work as a Special
Assistant Attorney General for the Flint water crisis, I was involved in the
extensive investigation led by Special Prosecutor Flood and then-Chief
Investigator Andrew Arena. I personally reviewed thousands of documents
and interviewed numerous witnesses. I was also present during one or more
investigative subpoena examinations—highly confidential procedures
pursuant to Michigan law, the subjects and dates of which cannot
be disclosed.
To protect the constitutional rights of defendants facing criminal
charges and to uphold and respect the ethical duties of a former prosecutor,
I do not discuss the criminal charges still pending in state court in this Essay,
except to explain their context as it relates to the federal constitutional cases.7
The focus of this Essay is the failure of environmental law in Flint and Flint’s
subsequent fight for constitutional rights and government accountability.
Further, I do not reference or rely upon any confidential information I have
from my former position. Throughout this Essay, I rely entirely and
exclusively on published court opinions, easily accessible court filings, and
local contemporaneous newspaper stories for the details of this ongoing
historic event. I do not and cannot discuss what I personally saw as a lawyer
investigating the poisoning of Flint, but these lines from my favorite poet
ring perfectly true:

5
See Flint Water Prosecution Team Expands Investigation Based on New Evidence, Dismisses Cases
Brought by Former Special Counsel, MICH. DEP’T OF ATT’Y GEN. (June 13, 2019),
https://www.michigan.gov/ag/news/press-releases/2019/06/13/flint-water-prosecution-team-expandsinvestigation-based-on-new-evidence [https://perma.cc/2HG7-HP8B].
6
See Nine Indicted on Criminal Charges in Flint Water Crisis Investigation, MICH. DEP’T OF ATT’Y
GEN. (Jan. 14, 2021), https://www.michigan.gov/ag/news/press-releases/2021/01/14/nine-indicted-oncriminal-charges-in-flint-water-crisis-investigation [https://perma.cc/855K-6XQQ]. For an update on the
investigation, see Ed White, Year Later, Flint Water Criminal Cases Move Slowly in Court, AP NEWS
(Jan. 12, 2022), https://apnews.com/article/health-environment-and-nature-environment-michigan-ricksnyder-2c5a150deacc902e197d449999b88dc5 [https://perma.cc/34Q8-DMSY]; and Ed White, Court
Kills Flint Water Charges Against Ex-Governor, Others, AP NEWS (June 28, 2022),
https://apnews.com/article/health-crime-michigan-indictments-rick-snyder609f461af3bb2d7f10a40c5d663620eb [https://perma.cc/Q73V-MLBJ].
7
See MICH. PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.6 & cmt. (“[T]here are vital social interests served by the free
dissemination of information about events having legal consequences and about legal proceedings
themselves. The public has a right to know about threats to its safety and measures aimed at assuring its
security. It also has a legitimate interest in the conduct of judicial proceedings, particularly in matters of
general public concern. Furthermore, the subject matter of legal proceedings is often of direct significance
in debate and deliberation over questions of public policy.”).
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Broken hands on broken ploughs
Broken treaties, broken vows
Broken pipes, broken tools
People bending broken rules
Hound dog howling, bullfrog croaking
Everything is broken8

I.

THE FLINT WATER CRISIS

The term “Flint water crisis,” as used by courts, refers to the
approximately eighteen months in 2014 and 2015 when government officials
“caused, sustained, and covered up the poisoning of an entire community
with lead- and legionella-contaminated water.”9 In this Essay, I organize the
actions and inactions of government that caused the Flint water crisis into
two parts: state and federal. First, I summarize the key state actions and
decisions beginning in 2011 that eventually led to the ongoing poisoning of
Flint’s drinking water starting in April 2014. My focus on state actions ends
in late 2015, by which time the Environmental Protection Agency’s
oversight and federal court litigation steered responsibility for the stillunfolding water crisis in Flint. This leads to the second part of the story of
the Flint water crisis—the failure of the federal Safe Drinking Water Act and
the EPA to stop the poisoning of Flint for nearly two years. While the actions
of the state discussed first are specific to Flint, the failures of federal
environmental law and governance discussed in the second Part are broadly
applicable. And while state actions explain why Flint was poisoned by its
public water, federal legal and governance failures explain how it could
happen for nearly two years with the EPA’s involvement.
A. The Poisoning of Flint’s Water by the State
To begin, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals describes the basic facts,
chemistry, and public harms of the Flint water crisis:
As a cost-saving measure until a new water authority was to become
operational, public officials switched the City of Flint municipal water supply
from the Detroit Water and Sewerage Department (DWSD) to the Flint River
to be processed by an outdated and previously mothballed water treatment plant.
With the approval of State of Michigan regulators and a professional
engineering firm, on April 25, 2014, the City began dispensing drinking water
to its customers without adding chemicals to counter the river water’s known
corrosivity.

8
9

BOB DYLAN, Everything Is Broken, on OH MERCY (Colum. Recs. 1989).
In re Flint Water Cases (Flint II), 960 F.3d 303, 310, 312 (6th Cir. 2020).
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The harmful effects were as swift as they were severe. Within days, residents
complained of foul smelling and tasting water. Within weeks, some residents’
hair began to fall out and their skin developed rashes. And within a year, there
were positive tests for E. coli, a spike in deaths from Legionnaires’ disease, and
reports of dangerously high blood-lead levels in Flint children. All of this
resulted because the river water was . . . [highly] corrosive . . . and because,
without corrosion-control treatment, lead leached out of the lead-based service
lines at alarming rates and found its way to the homes of Flint’s residents. The
crisis was predictable, and preventable.10

Flint is about sixty miles inland from Lake Huron, the world’s fourthlargest lake11 and one of the four Great Lakes (along with Superior,
Michigan, and Erie) that frame Michigan as the iconic freshwater peninsulas.
Since 1965, the sprawling Detroit regional water system12 had delivered
treated water from Lake Huron to Flint using a 72-inch pipeline.13 Flint thus
received treated Lake Huron water from the Detroit regional water system,
pursuant to a contracted price, for distribution to its residents and other
water users.14
Government officials were interested in building a new pipeline that
would essentially parallel the existing pipeline from Lake Huron to Flint, but
under the control of a newly chartered government corporation, the
Karegnondi Water Authority (KWA).15 As federal courts would later find,
Flint did not need this new pipeline. Funding the pipeline would create a
10
Guertin v. Michigan (Guertin I), 912 F.3d 907, 915 (6th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 933,
933 (2020).
11
How Far Is Port Huron from Flint?, MAPSOF.NET, https://www.mapsof.net/distance/port-huronto-flint [https://perma.cc/3TFF-HQDV]. Lake Huron is the world’s fourth-largest lake by surface area.
Nick Routley, The World’s 25 Largest Lakes, Side by Side, VISUAL CAPITALIST (Sept. 7, 2021),
https://www.visualcapitalist.com/worlds-25-largest-lakes/ [https://perma.cc/FRW7-2W2L]. The lake has
over 3,800 miles of shoreline. Lake Huron, MICH. SEA GRANT, https://www.michiganseagrant.org/
topics/great-lakes-fast-facts/lake-huron/ [https://perma.cc/98ZX-MJZG]. It also has the world’s largest
freshwater island (Manitoulin Island). Tony Briscoe, On the Largest Freshwater Island in the World,
Lake Huron’s Native Americans Warn of the Fragility of Water, CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 13, 2020, 6:06 AM),
https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/environment/great-lakes/ct-lake-huron-climate-change-nativeamericans-20200113-tf4vprfjmbgwhepnkh52gssihe-story.html [https://perma.cc/K95V-NHK5].
12
The regional water system was historically called the Detroit Water and Sewerage Department and
controlled by the City of Detroit; its assets in Flint were later leased to the Great Lakes Water Authority
with a different governance structure. See Mich. Dep’t of Env’t Quality v. City of Flint, 282 F. Supp. 3d
1002, 1005–06 (E.D. Mich. 2017); see also Claire Sabourin, Responding to the Detroit Water Crisis: The
Great Lakes Water Authority and the City of Detroit, 51 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 305, 313–14 (2016);
Anna Rossi, Regionalizing the Detroit Water and Sewerage Department, the Effects of Privatization on
Metro Detroit Residents and the Importance of Community Control, 17 J.L. SOC’Y 59, 61–68 (2016)
(providing additional history and analysis of the regionalization of the Detroit water system).
13
Mich. Dep’t of Env’t Quality, 282 F. Supp. 3d at 1005–06.
14
See id. at 1006.
15
See id.
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drinking water problem out of a solution to nothing.16 Further, these
investment decisions and water supply changes were not made by local
elected officials accountable to residents and water users, but by centralized,
state-appointed, state-directed managers.17
In 2011, the City of Flint was put under the State of Michigan’s
management and direct control. Pursuant to the then-recent Local
Government and School District Fiscal Accountability Act (known as “Act
4”), the governor could appoint an “emergency manager” for certain local
governments, who served at the governor’s pleasure.18 These governorappointed emergency managers in cities including Flint took over authority
to exercise typical local government powers. Emergency managers were
granted “broad powers” to “act for and in the place and stead of the
governing body and the office of chief administrative officer of the
local government.”19
The voters did not approve of the legislature’s work. On November 5,
2012, Public Act 4 was repealed by referendum.20 However, in December
2012, “the Michigan Legislature responded by enacting the Local Financial
Stability and Choice Act (‘Act 436’).”21 Like the voter-rejected Act 4, the
16

See id. The court in Michigan Department of Environmental Quality v. City of Flint ultimately
ordered an end to the Flint–KWA arrangement, returning Flint to the Detroit regional water system, with
a negotiated transfer of the KWA debt. See id. And a personal disclosure: As the former Executive
Director of the Great Lakes Environmental Law Center, I was involved in advocacy work opposing the
state’s authorization of this proposed new pipeline beginning in 2009, based on concerns that the new
spending would undermine existing infrastructure investment and divert resources from drinking water
protection. Letter from All. for the Great Lakes, et al. to Brant O. Fisher, Env’t Eng’r, Mich. Dep’t of
Env’t Quality (July 15, 2009), https://www.greatlakeslaw.org/files/genessee-final-comments.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6Q7K-QPH6]; see also Nick Schroeck, Genesee County’s Proposed Lake Huron Water
Withdrawal Would Drain Public Resources and Undermine Regional Cooperation, GREAT LAKES L.
(July 2009), https://www.greatlakeslaw.org/blog/2009/07/genesee-countys-proposed-lake-huron-waterwithdrawal-would-drain-public-resources-and-undermine-regi.html
[https://perma.cc/BAG4-ST8E]
(providing additional commentary at the time with concerns regarding the proposed KWA pipeline and
the impact on regional water infrastructure).
17
See Boler v. Earley, 865 F.3d 391, 396–97 (6th Cir. 2017).
18
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 141.1549(1) (2013); see also Guertin I, 912 F.3d 907, 939–40 (6th Cir.
2019). The history of the Michigan emergency manager laws is directly intertwined with the Flint water
crisis and deserves more attention than this Essay can provide. Other authors and published works have
detailed the direct connection between the centralization of power from local governments to the state
under emergency management and the resulting decisions about Flint’s water supply from 2011 through
2015. See Sara Hughes, Andrew Dick & Anna Kopec, Municipal Takeovers: Examining State Discretion
and Local Impacts in Michigan, 53 STATE & LOC. GOV’T. REV. 223, 225 (2021); Sara Hughes, Flint,
Michigan, and the Politics of Safe Drinking Water in the United States, 19 PERSPS. ON POLS. 1219,
1219 (2020).
19
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 141.1549(2) (2013) (codifying Public Act 436 of 2012 with the same
language as Public Act 4 of 2011, as discussed in the text accompanying notes 21–24 infra).
20
Boler, 865 F.3d at 397.
21
Id.
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new Act 436 authorized the state to appoint emergency managers who could
exercise the power of local governments.22 But unlike Act 4, Act 436 also
contained new appropriations provisions—and Michigan law does not allow
a public act with an appropriations provision to be rejected by referendum
like Act 4.23 Public Act 436 went into effect March 28, 2013, immune from
referendum. Thus, Flint immediately returned to the control of a state
emergency manager.24
On the day the new Public Act 436 took effect and the governor’s
appointed emergency manager was again running Flint, the state treasurer
emailed the governor recommending Flint leave the Detroit regional water
system and join the KWA.25 In 2013, as the Sixth Circuit noted, the governor
was directing the emergency managers for both Flint and Detroit, alongside
the Detroit Water and Sewerage Department—the regional water authority
serving Flint since 1965.26 The alignment of interests of Flint and Detroit was
supported by an independent engineering report. Commissioned by the state
treasurer, the report found that the most cost-effective plan was to continue
to get treated water through the Detroit regional water system rather than
joining a new water authority or building a treatment plant to take water from
the Flint River.27 Soon, however, the governor instead directed Flint to leave
the Detroit regional water system and join the KWA.28
For Flint, joining the KWA meant paying 34% of the costs associated
with the new pipeline’s construction, up-front, through bonding.29 Flint
borrowed $85,000,000 to fund the pipeline construction. Flint was also
responsible for paying an annual share of the KWA’s yearly operating costs.
This left Flint with a monthly bill of about $675,000 for KWA bond debt and
other KWA costs.30 But the KWA pipeline wouldn’t be completed or
delivering water for another two or three years.31 So the state planned for
22

Id. (citing Phillips v. Snyder, 836 F.3d 707, 711 (6th Cir. 2016)).
Id. (citing In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. 191, 251–52 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013)); Mich. United
Conservation Clubs v. Sec’y of State, 630 N.W.2d 297, 298 (Mich. 2001)).
24
See Boler, 865 F.3d at 396.
25
Flint II, 960 F.3d 303, 312 (6th Cir. 2020).
26
Id.; Mich. Dep’t of Env’t Quality v. City of Flint, 282 F. Supp. 3d 1002, 1005–06 (E.D. Mich
2017) (laying out the timeline of Flint’s water-sourcing).
27
Flint II, 960 F.3d at 312 (referencing the Tucker, Young, Jackson and Tull report).
28
Id. at 313.
29
Mich. Dep’t of Env’t Quality, 282 F. Supp. 3d at 1006.
30
Id. at 1008.
31
Flint II, 960 F.3d at 313 (noting that in 2013, the governor “authorized [the emergency manager],
through Department of Treasury officials, to enter into a contractual relationship with the KWA for the
purpose of supplying water to Flint beginning in mid-year 2016 or 2017” and that “[t]he City would need
to rely on a water source other than the KWA until then” (emphasis omitted) (quoting Fourth Consol.
23
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Flint to simply take water from the Flint River, without a new water
treatment plant, until the new KWA pipeline was constructed.32
Please don’t blame the Flint River for the resulting drinking water
disaster. The government did not pay for treated water or invest in water
treatment from any source for Flint citizens for approximately eighteen
months—April 2014 to October 2015.33 The Flint River could provide safe
and reliable drinking water with a proper water treatment plant, concluded a
2011 study for Flint and state government officials. 34 That study called for
over $69 million in improvements to the existing historic Flint Water
Treatment Plant or a new facility, including improvements for corrosion
control, for the water to meet regulatory requirements. 35 None of these
improvements was made.36 The Detroit regional water system did invest in a
water treatment plant at the Lake Huron intake when it built Flint’s pipeline
in the 1960s, but the Flint emergency manager undermined that investment
by leaving the system for the parallel KWA project.37 Acting as though there
was an urgency to end investment in Detroit’s water system, the state
directed Flint to break from the Detroit regional water system in 2014, years
before either the KWA pipeline or a new Flint water treatment plant could
be operational. 38
April 25, 2014, was the scheduled date of the switch to the Flint River.39
In the weeks before the switch, the Flint water plant supervisor warned senior
state environmental department regulators that adequate treatment could not
and would not be accomplished in time.40 Key to adequate treatment was
corrosion control, as the “Flint River water had high chloride levels that, left
untreated, would corrode the water pipes and cause lead to leach into

Amended Class Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, Money Damages, and Jury Demand at
43, In re Flint Water Cases, 384 F. Supp. 3d 802 (E.D. Mich. 2019) (No. 16-10444) [hereinafter Fourth
Amended Complaint])).
32
Id.
33
Id. at 312.
34
Id. (citing Fourth Amended Complaint, supra note 31, at 36–37).
35
Id.
36
Boler v. Earley, 865 F.3d 391, 398 (6th Cir. 2017).
37
See Mich. Dep’t of Env’t Quality v. City of Flint, 282 F. Supp. 3d 1002, 1005–06 (E.D.
Mich. 2017).
38
Id. at 1006.
39
Flint II, 960 F.3d at 313. On this date, the last contract between Flint and the Detroit regional
system for the delivery of treated water ended. At this time, and all times during the breakdown between
Flint and the Detroit regional water system, both Flint and Detroit were under emergency managers that
reported to the governor per statute. Id. at 313.
40
See id. at 314 (“I need time to adequately train additional staff and to update our monitoring plans
before I will feel we are ready.” (quoting Fourth Amended Complaint, supra note 31, at 46)).
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drinking water.”41 Regulators ignored the warnings. On April 25, 2014, with
the state’s legal permission and direction pursuant to the Safe Drinking
Water Act,42 Flint switched from the Detroit regional water system to the
Flint River and “began delivering untreated water to its residents.”43 The
Sixth Circuit succinctly explained the science—both chemical and
political—behind this decision which resulted in unsafe water for Flint:
Within weeks of the switch, residents reported to [senior state regulatory
officials] that there was something wrong with the smell, taste, and color of the
water, and that it was causing rashes. By June 2014, residents were reporting
that “the water was making them ill.” The City and State did nothing. “On
August 14, 2014, Flint’s water tested above legal limits for total coliform and
E. coli bacteria.” In response, the City issued boil water advisories and treated
the water with additional chlorine. Chlorine, however, “as has been well known
for decades,” “preferentially reacts with the bare metal [in corroded pipes]
instead of attacking solely bacteria.” Unsurprisingly, then, the bacterial
problem did not abate—so the City added still more chlorine. The water then
tested high in total trihalomethanes (“TTHM”), a byproduct of chlorine
interacting with metal, and a “red flag that the steel in the pipes had been laid
bare,” and that lead was leaching into the water.44

The poisoning of Flint’s water had begun. In September 2014, the state
health department reported “higher than usual” lead poisoning rates for
children in Flint during the preceding three months.45 On October 13, 2014,
“General Motors stopped using Flint River water at its Flint engine plant”
due to concerns about the high levels of chloride corroding its machinery.46
The following day, a member of the governor’s executive staff wrote to
the team:
Now we are getting comments about being lab rats in the media, which are
going to be exacerbated when it comes out that after the boil water order, there
were chemicals in the water that exceeded health-based water quality standards.
I think we should ask the [Emergency Manager] to consider coming back to the

41

Id. (quoting Fourth Amended Complaint, supra note 31, at 55).
Burgess v. United States, 375 F. Supp. 3d 796, 803 (E.D. Mich. 2019) (describing how state
environmental regulators “approved Flint’s water source change, but did not require Flint to begin
corrosion control prior to the switch”).
43
Flint II, 960 F.3d at 314–15. The state and local authorities did not, and were not required to, notify
the EPA of the changing water sources for Flint. “The EPA does not approve such a switch in a primacy
State.” Burgess, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 803; see also infra note 55 and accompanying text (discussing
primacy state).
44
Flint II, 960 F.3d at 315 (quoting Fourth Amended Complaint, supra note 31, at 57–58).
45
Id. (quoting Fourth Amended Complaint, supra note 31, at 59–60).
46
Id. at 315–16.
42
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Detroit system in full or in part as an interim solution to both the quality, and
now the financial, problems that the current solution is causing.47

Around this time, the governor’s legal counsel further cautioned that
the Flint River water issues were “downright scary” and advised that “[t]hey
should try to get back on the Detroit system as a stopgap ASAP before this
thing gets too far out of control.”48
They didn’t get back on the Detroit system ASAP, and things soon got
too far out of control. In January 2015, just before the EPA got involved, the
University of Michigan closed water fountains at its Flint campus because
testing showed high lead levels, and state officials “discreetly” installed
water coolers “in State buildings located in Flint.”49 But despite the state’s
efforts, the public knew something was wrong with Flint’s water. And so did
the EPA.
B. How the Safe Drinking Water Act and the EPA Failed Flint
The Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974 (SDWA) governs the regulation
of public drinking water in the United States and is the legal authority for
setting regulatory standards. It works like other major federal environmental
regulatory laws, notably the Clean Air Act50 and Clean Water Act,51 which
were enacted in the two preceding sessions of Congress. These federal
environmental laws empower and direct the federal and state governments
to set standards and regulate pollution sources. As Flint residents
experienced, the federal government is not really in charge of these federal
laws, the standards are fundamentally unjust, and regulating pollution
sources is not the same as actually delivering safe drinking water.52 The
administration of environmental law in Flint by the EPA and the state, briefly
summarized below, exemplifies why millions of U.S. citizens are delivered
unsafe water every year despite nearly fifty years of the SDWA and drinking
water regulatory bureaucracies in both the federal and state governments.53
47

Id. at 316 (quoting Fourth Amended Complaint, supra note 31, at 60–61).
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Fourth Amended Complaint, supra note 31, at 61).
49
Id.
50
42 U.S.C. § 7401.
51
33 U.S.C. § 1251.
52
Previewing Boler, infra notes 104–108 and accompanying text, Professors David A. Dana and
Deborah Tuerkheimer characterize the Flint water crisis as “a paradigmatic case of unequal protection
due to the state’s failure to enforce the laws.” David A. Dana & Deborah Tuerkheimer, After Flint:
Environmental Justice as Equal Protection, 111 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 93, 93 (2017).
53
In any given year from 1982 to 2015, somewhere between 9 million and 45 million Americans
got their drinking water from a source that was in violation of the SDWA. Maura Allaire, Haowei Wu &
Upmanu Lall, National Trends in Drinking Water Quality Violations, 115 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCIS.
2078, 2078 (2018).
48
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The SDWA directs the EPA to promulgate national primary drinking
water standards and to regulate public water systems.54 But states can borrow
primary authority over environmental regulation from the EPA if they have
comparable or stricter standards and adequate inspection and monitoring
capacity for enforcement.55 Overall, environmental regulatory programs
(including drinking water in Michigan56) are overwhelmingly handed over to
the states under this “primacy.”57 The EPA still has tremendous oversight
authority and power under the SDWA and other laws, from technical
assistance to enforcement orders.58 This “joint Federal–State system” is
called “cooperative federalism.”59
In theory, the involvement of three levels of government [federal, state, and
local] in the problem of drinking water contamination guards against failure at
any one level of government. . . . In actuality, to lesser or greater degrees in
different parts of the United States, the SDWA regime resembles a collective
abdication, rather than a cooperation, regime.60

The first failure under the SDWA was on the regulatory books twenty
years before the water switch scheme in Flint and extended nationwide. In
1991, the EPA established requirements for regulating lead in drinking
water, known as the Lead and Copper Rule (LCR).61 The EPA’s rule does
54

See 42 U.S.C. § 300f(4).
See id. § 300g-2; see also 40 C.F.R. §§ 142.10, 142.11.
56
See Burgess v. United States, 375 F. Supp. 3d 796, 802 (E.D. Mich. 2019); Mays v. City of Flint,
871 F.3d 437, 446 (6th Cir. 2017).
57
See ELENA H. HUMPHREYS & MARY TIEMANN, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL31243, SAFE DRINKING
WATER ACT (SDWA): A SUMMARY OF THE ACT AND ITS MAJOR REQUIREMENTS 9 (2021). The EPA has
delegated the SDWA’s public water supply regulatory program to 49 states, all territories, and the Navajo
Nation. Similarly, 46 of the 50 states have primacy for the national water pollution permitting program
under the Clean Water Act. LAURA GATZ, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL30030, CLEAN WATER ACT: A
SUMMARY OF THE LAW 4 (2016).
58
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 300g-3, 300i(a); see also 40 C.F.R. §§ 141.82(i), 141.83(b)(7), 142.15, 142.19,
142.30, 142.34 (describing various situations in which the EPA interacts with the administration of the
SDWA). Ultimately, if the EPA determines that a state no longer meets its requirements, the EPA is
required to initiate proceedings to withdraw the state’s primacy approval. See 40 C.F.R. § 142.17(a)(2).
59
Mays, 871 F.3d at 447.
60
David A. Dana, Escaping the Abdication Trap when Cooperative Federalism Fails: Legal Reform
After Flint, 44 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1329, 1334 (2017); see also Cara Cunningham Warren, An American
Reset—Safe Water & a Workable Model of Federalism, 27 DUKE ENV’T. L. & POL’Y F. 51, 52 (2016)
(describing flaws in the SDWA regime).
61
40 C.F.R. § 141.80(c); Drinking Water Regulations, 56 Fed. Reg. 26460 (June 7, 1991); see also
Dana, supra note 60, at 1336 (“From the outset, however, the LCR has been criticized as setting too low
an action level for lead in water; for providing for too little and too infrequent testing for lead; for leaving
too much discretion to local water authorities as to how, when, and where to test for lead; and for leaving
too much discretion to authorities regarding corrosion control treatment.”). Michigan adopted the 1991
LCR almost verbatim, but after the Flint water crisis it implemented some stricter standards in the existing
55
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not prevent all lead in drinking water—it does not even set an upper limit to
the amount of lead that can come through an individual’s tap. Instead, the
rule requires sampling about 0.1% of a city’s taps62 for an “action level” of
lead in tap water of fifteen parts per billion (ppb),63 and then only taking
action if more than 10% of those samples are above fifteen ppb.64 And the
fifteen ppb sample threshold only triggers action if it occurs over two
consecutive six-month periods.65 This can add up to a lot of people being
poisoned a little (many taps contaminated to just under the fifteen ppb
threshold), and some people being poisoned a lot (a few highly contaminated
taps), over the course of one to two years under the EPA’s and state’s
administration of the SDWA.66 If that wasn’t the government’s plan for Flint,
it soon became obvious that it was the outcome.67 And attorneys for both the

regime, most notably lowering the action level for lead to twelve parts per billion, effective 2025. See
Nicholas J. Schroeck, The Flint Water Crisis, Drinking Water Regulations and Gaps in Lead, Copper,
and Legionella Protections, 97 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 509, 520 (2020).
62
The LCR requires sixty samples for a city serving fewer than 100,000 people and 100 samples for
larger cities. 40 C.F.R. § 141.86(c).
63
40 C.F.R. § 141.80(c)(1); see also David Domagala Mitchell, Preventing Toxic Lead Exposure
Through Drinking Water Using Point-of-Use Filtration, 48 ENV’T L. REP. 11074, 11085 (2018).
64
See 40 C.F.R. § 141.80 (“The lead action level is exceeded if the concentration of lead in more
than 10% of tap water samples collected during any monitoring period . . . is greater than 0.015 mg/L
[fifteen ppb].”).
65
40 C.F.R. § 141.86(a), (d).
66
The EPA’s lead rule under the SDWA allows a government to deliver tap water with up to fourteen
ppb of lead to any number of homes, and further allows delivery of tap water at any lead level to up to
9% of homes. See 40 C.F.R. § 141.81(b), (d).
67
Following the switch to untreated Flint River water in April 2014, sampling from July 2014 to
December 2014 and from January 2015 to June 2015 showed 90th percentile lead levels of six ppb and
eleven ppb respectively, both under the fifteen-ppb action level, during the peak year of the crisis. See
Concerned Pastors for Soc. Action v. Khouri (Khouri II), 217 F. Supp. 3d 960, 965 (E.D. Mich. 2016).

135

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

federal68 and state69 governments have argued repeatedly in court that it was
a permissible outcome under the SDWA.
The SDWA is structurally and fundamentally flawed. But the EPA also
failed to use the powers and processes it does have under the law to protect
Flint. Returning to the events of the Flint water crisis, by January 2015,
evidence of unsafe water was mounting at the EPA. Flint resident LeeAnn
Walters contacted the EPA after the official SDWA test results of her home’s
tap water showed lead levels of 104 ppb.70 In February 2015, the EPA’s
program managers sent a series of emails to Michigan’s program managers
detailing concerns with both the water chemistry and the state’s regulatory
decisions in Flint.71 The state’s succinct written response to the EPA’s
prescient concerns: “[W]e will take it under consideration.”72
Over the next several months, through its drinking water regulations
manager, the EPA continued detailing concerns to the state about the
unfolding crisis in Flint. And the state, through its respective drinking water
program managers, continued its position that the EPA’s own lead rule did
not require corrosion control treatment until the results exceeded the fifteenppb action level for two consecutive six-month testing periods.73 In June
2015, the EPA drinking water regulations manager circulated a report
thoroughly and presciently explaining the Flint water crisis. Along with
pages of data and evidence, it states plainly:
68
“The United States contends that because of ambiguities in the Lead and Copper Rule that existed
in 2015, the EPA could not have made a finding of noncompliance to trigger . . . [EPA’s enforcement]
duties.” In re Flint Water Cases (Flint I), 482 F. Supp. 3d 601, 628 (E.D. Mich. 2020). Further:

The United States argues that the EPA’s decisions about whether and how to respond to the Flint
Water Crisis are all susceptible to policy analysis. The United States contends that the EPA was
balancing multiple and competing policy considerations during the Flint Water Crisis, such as the
SDWA’s goal of cooperative federalism, the effectiveness of state and local authorities in
protecting the health of their citizens, and the short and long-term effects of any actions on the
relationship between the EPA and primacy State.
Id. at 633; see also Burgess v. United States, 375 F. Supp. 3d 796, 807 (E.D. Mich. 2019) (describing
arguments “maintaining that the State’s lead compliance sampling procedures comply with federal
SDWA requirements”).
69
See Burgess, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 803–04 (“MDEQ interpreted the Lead and Copper Rule (‘LCR’)
as allowing Flint to complete two consecutive six-month rounds of sampling prior to determining what,
if any corrosion control treatment was needed for the Flint River water. Its wrongful and damaging
interpretation was later admitted by [the state environmental agency] Director Dan Wyant.” (citations
omitted)).
70
Id. at 804 n.3. In subsequent litigation, the United States expressly admitted to the facts cited in
this Essay from the trial court’s opinion in Burgess. Flint I, 482 F. Supp. 3d at 608.
71
Burgess, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 805.
72
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Planitiff’s Response Exhibit 1, Burgess, 375 F. Supp. 3d 796
(No. 17-cv-11218)). The state also noted, as discussed above, that its 90th percentile of lead levels from
sampled households had never exceeded the fifteen-ppb action level. Id.
73
Id. at 805–06.
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They have no corrosion control treatment in place for over a year now and they
have lead service lines. It’s just basic chemistry on lead solubility. . . . We don’t
need to drop a bowling ball off every building in every town to know that it will
fall to the ground in all of these places.74

Based on information in the report circulated in June 2015, the EPA could
have issued an enforcement order directing the state to switch back to the
Detroit regional water system and stopped the crisis at that time.75 Instead,
for another six months, EPA regional staff merely continued to offer
“technical assistance” while EPA headquarters developed a “policy
memorandum” “clarifying” its interpretation of its own lead rule (stating
“that there are differing possible interpretations” of the rule as applied to
Flint’s situation).76
On October 8, 2015, the governor ordered Flint to reconnect with the
Detroit regional water system for treated water.77 On October 16, 2015, Flint
switched back to getting treated water from the Detroit regional water
system.78 The EPA eventually issued an Emergency Administrative Order
pursuant to the SDWA on January 21, 2016,79 a year after EPA staff were
emailing each other and the state with concerns about the unfolding crisis,
six months after the EPA drinking water manager’s report recommending
74

Id. at 806 (quoting Exhibit 5, Burgess, 375 F. Supp. 3d 796 (E.D. Mich 2019) (No. 17-cv-11218)).
Flint I, 482 F. Supp. 3d at 634 (citing the EPA Office of Inspector General’s report). The June
report detailed five separate violations of the SDWA in Flint from September 2014 to June 2015. Id. at
628. Instead of directing immediate enforcement, the EPA’s regional administrator disavowed the
drinking water regulation manager’s report in communications with state and local officials, calling it
“preliminary” and “premature.” Id. at 619–20. Much of the report material was eventually officially
released by the EPA after Flint switched back to treated Detroit regional water. Id.
76
Burgess, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 807 & n.4 (quoting Defendant’s Response Exhibit 31, Burgess, 375 F.
Supp. 3d 796 (E.D. Mich 2019) (No. 17-cv-11218)).
77
Flint II, 960 F.3d 303, 320 (6th Cir. 2020). Back on March 25, 2015, the practically powerless
Flint City Council had voted to reconnect to the Detroit regional water system to get treated and safe
water; the governor’s appointed emergency manager had rejected the vote. Perhaps coincidentally, the
Detroit regional water system had changed political hands by the time the governor ordered Flint to return
to it. See Matt Helms, Duggan Nominates New Leaders for Water Department, DETROIT FREE PRESS
(Oct. 6, 2015, 9:13 PM ET), https://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/detroit/2015/10/06/
duggan-nominates-new-leaders-water-department/73440798/
[https://perma.cc/5RCK-DFK6].
In
October 2015, Flint contracted with the regionally controlled Great Lakes Water Authority (GLWA)—
which had become the lessee of Detroit Water and Sewerage Department’s assets outside of Detroit.
Mich. Dep’t of Env’t Quality v. City of Flint, 282 F. Supp. 3d 1002, 1006 (E.D. Mich. 2017).
78
Burgess, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 808. That same date, the EPA established its “Flint Safe Drinking
Water Task Force” to provide technical expertise. Id.
79
U.S. ENV’T. PROT. AGENCY, OFF. OF ENF’T & COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE, EMERGENCY
ADMINISTRATIVE
ORDER
(2016),
https://www.greatlakeslaw.org/Flint/EPA_Emergency_
Administrative_Order.pdf [https://perma.cc/MYD6-E5GV]. The EPA’s administrative order found that
the state’s response to the Flint water crisis was inadequate to protect public health and gave Flint and the
state specific water treatment, monitoring, reporting, and management tasks. The EPA order did not find
an ongoing violation of the SDWA or issue any fines or penalties. Id.
75
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urgent action, two months after the state relented to public pressure and
switched Flint back to treated Detroit system water, and almost a week after
President Obama declared a federal emergency in Flint.80 Nearly two years
after the poisoning of Flint began, the EPA finally took the legal position that
the state’s operation of the Flint water supply “present[ed] an imminent and
substantial endangerment to the health of persons” and enforced
the SDWA.81
II. FLINT’S FIGHT FOR JUSTICE
“At the end of the day, we are not just victims, we’re fighters.”
—Melissa Mays82

With Flint switched back to the Detroit regional water system and
receiving treated water, and after the state promised new resources and
funding to help Flint’s residents,83 the EPA’s Emergency Administrative
Order in January 2016 could have been the last legal word on the Flint water
crisis. But for Flint’s residents, it was too little too late. They wanted legal
justice, not just improved compliance.
A. Winning Equitable Remedies to Correct Systemic
Environmental Injustice
The first major case was a citizen suit under the SDWA, filed January
27, 2016.84 The citizens had given notice of their intent to sue the government
defendants in November 2015, before the EPA took enforcement action.85
But, pursuant to the SDWA, the citizens were required to wait sixty days
80

Burgess, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 804–07. The Obama declaration was on January 16, 2016. Id. at 808.
U.S. ENV’T. PROT. AGENCY, OFF. OF ENF’T & COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE, supra note 79.
82
BENJAMIN J. PAULI, FLINT FIGHTS BACK: ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND DEMOCRACY IN THE
FLINT WATER CRISIS 127 (2019). Melissa Mays is a lead plaintiff in numerous published opinions
vindicating Flint residents’ constitutional rights. Wendy N. Davis, Who’s to Blame for Poisoning of
Flint’s Water?, ABA J. (Nov. 1, 2016), https://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/flint_water_crisis_
whos_to_blame [https://perma.cc/P3LG-U3SZ].
83
Kristin Moore, Mayor Dayne Walling Expresses Gratitude to State Legislature for Approval of
Funding to Support Flint Water Needs, CITY OF FLINT (Oct. 15, 2015), https://www.cityofflint.com/
2015/10/15/mayor-dayne-walling-expresses-gratitude-to-state-legislature-for-approval-of-funding-tosupport-flint-water-needs/ [https://perma.cc/8DEB-PZGC].
84
Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Concerned Pastors for Soc. Action v. Khouri,
No. 16-10277, 2016 WL 9223838 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 26, 2016), http://www.greatlakeslaw.org/
files/concerned_pastors_for_social_action_aclu_nrdc_v_khouri_complaint.pdf [https://perma.cc/6S2RB46S].
85
Notice of Intent to Sue from Concerned Pastors for Social Action et al. to City of Flint et al. (Nov.
16 2015), http://www.greatlakeslaw.org/files/aclu_nrdc_noi.pdf [https://perma.cc/ELZ7-UDLL]. The
citizens had also petitioned the EPA directly to take Emergency Action. Petition for Emergency Action
from Petitioners Coalition for Clean Water et al. to E.P.A. (Oct. 1, 2015), http://www.greatlakeslaw.org/
files/aclu_nrdc_petition.pdf [https://perma.cc/LY4H-6WHU].
81
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following notice of their intent to sue before a federal court would have
jurisdiction over their suit.86 This sixty-day notice period before invoking
federal court jurisdiction for citizen suits is common to all major federal
environmental laws.87 As a jurisdictional requirement based on separation of
powers, it creates a buffer between the Executive Branch and Judicial
Branch, allowing the executive agencies two months to bring an enforcement
action, which then precludes the citizen suit.88 It is a common hurdle for
citizen enforcement and the first requirement to check off in a litigation
attack list. And, as if demonstrating the mechanism’s design, following the
citizen notice of intent to sue in sixty days, the EPA shifted from offering
technical guidance to issuing a formal Emergency Administrative Order
against the state, naming the State of Michigan, its environmental agency,
and the City of Flint as Respondents. This would typically leave the citizens
with the recourse of challenging the EPA action pursuant to the SDWA.89
But instead of seeking judicial review of the EPA’s SDWA
enforcement order, as the government claimed was proper, the citizens filed
their own complaint against the state defendants under the SDWA. And the
citizens did not just want an order to improve compliance with the SDWA
in Flint—they sought injunctive relief ordering the State to provide every
resident in Flint with safe drinking water immediately.90 In its first published
decision on the matter, the federal district court allowed the citizen suit to
proceed despite the jurisdictional objections of the state government:
[Three citizen organizations], and a Flint resident, have turned to the federal
courts for relief from the hardship visited on the population caused by the
mishandling of the City’s water treatment and distribution system. The . . .
[government] defendants have filed motions to dismiss, arguing, among other
things, that the federal district court should not, or cannot, get involved, and the
plaintiffs should be content with the remedial course charted by the
Environmental Protection Agency. The Court disagrees. . . . [T]he Court
believes that it should not defer to the EPA’s “primary jurisdiction” to address
86

See 42 U.S.C. § 300j–8(b)(1).
See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(A) (Clean Water Act); 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b)(1)(A) (Clean Air
Act); 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(1)(A) (Resource Conservation and Recovery Act).
88
See ZYGMUNT PLATER, ROBERT ABRAMS, ROBERT GRAHAM, LISA HEINZERLING, NOAH HALL &
DAVID WIRTH, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW, AND SOCIETY 817 (5th ed. 2016);
Justin Vickers, Res Judicata Claim Preclusion of Properly Filed Citizen Suits, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1623,
1631 (2010); see also Hallstrom v. Tillamook Cnty., 493 U.S. 20, 24–25 (1989); Robin Kundis Craig,
Notice Letters and Notice Pleading: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Sufficiency of
Environmental Citizen Suit Notice, 78 OR. L. REV. 105, 108 (1999).
89
See 42 U.S.C. § 300j–7(a)(2) (providing for judicial review of final agency actions under
the SDWA).
90
See Concerned Pastors for Soc. Action v. Khouri (Khouri I), 194 F. Supp. 3d 589, 595–96 (E.D.
Mich. 2016).
87
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the plaintiffs’ complaints, the lawsuit is not a disguised appeal of the EPA’s
January 2016 order, the relief the plaintiffs seek is, in the main, prospective and
the Eleventh Amendment does not bar this lawsuit against the State
defendants . . . .91

Following an evidentiary hearing wherein witnesses for both the
plaintiff citizens and the defendant State testified about their experience with
Flint’s water, the court concluded: “In modern society, when we turn on a
faucet, we expect safe drinking water to flow out. As the evidence shows,
that is no longer the case in Flint.”92
To remedy this, the court used its equitable powers to order a
comprehensive “door-to-door” bottled water delivery program to every Flint
household.93 The State sought to stay this extraordinary remedy, arguing
again that there were no ongoing violations of the SDWA to warrant relief.94
And regardless, the State insisted, the relief ordered—door-to-door delivery
of bottled water—was neither possible nor necessary.95 The Sixth Circuit
ultimately denied the State’s requested stay and upheld the district court’s
entire injunctive order for door-to-door water delivery to all Flint
households. The court’s per curiam order simply stated “that it is an
immediate requirement, under the Safe Drinking Water Act’s (SDWA) Lead
and Copper Rule that the State Defendants’ [sic] provide safe drinking water
to all residents of Flint.”96
The SDWA citizen suit eventually resulted in a comprehensive
settlement with the State to replace all lead pipes in Flint within three years
and to fix many other issues with the drinking water regulations and

91

Id. at 593.
Khouri II, 217 F. Supp. 3d 960, 972 (E.D. Mich. 2016).
93
Id. at 980–81.
94
The district court had originally misread the SDWA and lead rule as stating that a result above the
action level of fifteen ppb amounted to a per se violation of the SDWA, when it instead triggers certain
required steps. The district court in its final order denying stay did acknowledge this previous
misinterpretation of the lead rule but maintained the Flint system was still not in compliance with the
SDWA. See Concerned Pastors for Soc. Action v. Khouri (Khouri III), 220 F. Supp. 3d 823, 828 (E.D.
Mich. 2016); Concerned Pastors for Soc. Action v. Khouri (Khouri IV), 844 F.3d 546, 553 (6th Cir. 2016)
(Sutton, J., dissenting).
95
See Khouri III, 220 F. Supp. 3d at 826 (recounting the state’s argument that ordering bottled water
delivery was “unreasonable and overbroad” and that leaving it up to individuals to find their own method
of drinking water delivery was “good enough”).
96
Khouri IV, 844 F.3d at 549. Judge Sutton’s dissent returned to the question of the federal court’s
jurisdiction. “On this record, the State is in compliance with the Safe Drinking Water Act and the EPA’s
regulations. Until the plaintiffs can show an ongoing violation of these or other laws, the court has no
basis for issuing injunctive relief.” Id. at 553 (Sutton, J., dissenting).
92

140

117:123 (2022)

Flint’s Fight for Environmental Rights

management.97 This gave the residents the remedies they wanted with the
water system moving forward. But the residents also wanted accountability
and damages from their government for the harm done. That’s not available
under the SDWA, even with a court persuaded to use extraordinary equitable
powers. Federal environmental laws do not provide any liability for harm or
any cause of action for damages done by state or federal actors; the only
relief is for compliance orders and government penalties.98 To obtain
damages from the state for alleged legal wrongs, citizens typically use
42 U.S.C. § 1983 as a cause of action and claim violations of substantive due
process rights.99 There are numerous doctrinal hurdles and obstacles to
bringing these actions for environmental harms. They may have seemed
insurmountable—until the Flint residents went to court.
B. Upholding Due Process and Equal Protection in
Environmental Law and Governance
Plaintiff citizens seeking damages from government actors for
violations of the Constitution or other legal duties must rely on 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983.100 However, in 1981, the Supreme Court ruled that § 1983 claims
brought by citizens who suffered alleged damages from water pollution to
their fishing waters were precluded by federal environmental statutes and
their regulatory and enforcement schemes101 (essentially cooperative
federalism102). The Court’s § 1983 preclusion rule from the Sea Clammers
case would apply broadly:
When the remedial devices provided in a particular Act are sufficiently
comprehensive, they may suffice to demonstrate congressional intent to
97
Settlement Agreement, Khouri III, 220 F. Supp. 3d 823 (E.D. Mich. 2016) (No. 16-10277),
http://www.greatlakeslaw.org/Flint/Concerned_Pastors_for_Social_Action_Settlement_Agreement.pdf
[https://perma.cc/53CP-F3AE].
98
See PLATER ET AL., supra note 88, at 817; see also Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake
Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 49 (1987).
99
The Supreme Court revitalized § 1983 of the Reconstruction-era Civil Rights Act of 1871 in its
1961 decision Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172 (1961), holding that individuals could utilize the cause
of action against state and local officers to vindicate constitutional rights against brutal police tactics.
100
Section 1983 provides:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any
State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit
in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
101

Middlesex Cnty. Sewerage Auth. v. Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1, 20 (1981) (citing the
remedies given plaintiffs by the Federal Water Pollution Control Act and the Marine Protection, Research,
and Sanctuaries Act).
102
See supra notes 59–60 and accompanying text.
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preclude the remedy of suits under § 1983. [Similarly,] when “a state official is
alleged to have violated a federal statute which provides its own comprehensive
enforcement scheme, the requirements of that enforcement procedure may not
be bypassed by bringing suit directly under § 1983.”103

The Supreme Court’s preclusion rule seemed to close the door on using
§ 1983 for environmental harms. Notably, the First Circuit in 1992 (Matoon
v. Pittsfield) ruled that the SDWA precluded § 1983 claims for violations of
any rights or duties regarding safe drinking water.104 The Flint residents
persuaded the Sixth Circuit to disagree.
In late 2015 and early 2016, Flint residents brought several individual
and class actions against numerous state officials, including the governor and
the appointed emergency managers in Flint.105 They alleged substantive due
process and equal protection violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district
court dismissed the § 1983 claims as precluded by the SDWA, relying on the
Supreme Court’s Sea Clammers preclusion rule and the First Circuit’s
holding of preclusion for safe drinking water in Matoon.106
In a unanimous decision, the Sixth Circuit took a very different view of
the interplay between the SDWA and the protection of individual rights
regarding safe drinking water:
In a wide variety of circumstances, conduct that violates the SDWA might not
violate the Equal Protection Clause, and vice versa. For example, a government
entity could provide water through a public system with contaminant levels in
excess of national drinking water standards without infringing on any equal
protection principles. Likewise, a government entity could provide some
customers with water that meets the requirements of SDWA standards, but that
is nonetheless dirtier, smellier, or of demonstrably poorer quality than water
provided to other customers. The water also could be polluted by a contaminant
not regulated by the SDWA. Even though not violating the SDWA, these
situations could create an equal protection issue, particularly if such distinction
were based on intentional discrimination or lacked a rational basis.107

The court further explained how a substantive due process violation could
occur despite SDWA compliance:
Likewise, a state actor’s deliberately indifferent action concerning
contaminants in public water systems, which created a special danger to a
103
Id. (quoting Chapman v. Hous. Welfare Rts. Org., 441 U.S. 600, 673 n.2 (1979) (Stewart,
J., dissenting)).
104
980 F.2d 1, 4–6 (1st Cir. 1992).
105
Boler v. Earley, 865 F.3d 391, 399–400 (6th Cir. 2017).
106
Id.; Mays v. Snyder, No. 15-14002, 2017 WL 445637, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 2, 2017), aff’d in
part, rev’d in part, Boler, 865 F.3d 391.
107
Boler, 865 F.3d at 407–08.
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plaintiff that the state knew or should have known about, could violate the Due
Process Clause without also violating the SDWA, if the hypothetical
contaminants did not exceed the statutory maximums or were not regulated by
it.108

The court’s opinion effectively freed the litigant citizens from the
limitations of the flawed governance regime and unprotective standards of
the SDWA. The ruling should warn environmental regulators and other state
actors that they have a solemn duty to protect citizens’ constitutional rights,
regardless of the state’s administrative and regulatory authority pursuant to
statutes. Due process and equal protection can—and must—be brought into
environmental law and governance.
C. Advancing a Substantive Right to Bodily Integrity
Against State-Created Pollution
With SDWA preclusion overcome, Flint residents and the State were
primed to argue the underlying constitutional law question: Was the Flint
water crisis a violation of constitutional rights? The citizen plaintiffs focused
their evidence and arguments on the claim that state actors violated their right
to bodily integrity as guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.109 The clause provides that “no State shall . . . deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property.”110
Due process is the foundation of individual liberty in our legal system.
The Constitution’s due process protection was passed down from the Magna
Carta, “intended to secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the
powers of government, unrestrained by the established principles of private
right and distributive justice.”111 The Supreme Court often states that “[t]he
touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against arbitrary
action of government.”112 Substantively, due process protects against “the
exercise of power without any reasonable justification in the service of a
legitimate governmental objective.”113 There are procedural aspects to due
process, but the substantive guarantee “bar[s] certain government actions
regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them.”114
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110
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
111
Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845 (1998) (internal quotation marks omitted)
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The protections of due process apply to “fundamental rights and
liberties which are, objectively, ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and
tradition,’ and ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,’ such that ‘neither
liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed.’”115 This requires a
historical look at the common law for rights and privileges recognized “as
essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.”116 Most essential
of these foundational rights is that of bodily integrity.117 “No right is held
more sacred, or is more carefully guarded by the common law, than the right
of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from
all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable
authority of law.”118
The Supreme Court has developed different tests for violations of due
process rights depending on whether the government action was legislative
or executive. For violations arising from executive actions, such as the Flint
water crisis, the protections of substantive due process are limited to
circumstances in which the executive’s abuse of power “shocks the
conscience.”119 Three factors guide this test: (1) the voluntariness of the
plaintiffs’ relationship with the government, (2) the time for the government
actor to deliberate, and (3) the legitimacy of the government interest.120 These
factors then apply to the alleged violation of the right to bodily integrity.
Most bodily integrity cases involve a physical restraint on the
individual. But the Supreme Court and the Sixth Circuit have occasionally
gone beyond that setting and recognized other circumstances in which
individuals were involuntarily or unknowingly subjected to a government
intrusion on their persons.121 In considering the Flint water crisis as a
violation of bodily integrity rights, the Sixth Circuit looked back on the
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infamous Cincinnati radiation experiments.122 During the Cold War,
government officials working at the University of Cincinnati subjected
cancer patients to radiation doses consistent with those expected to be
inflicted upon military personnel during a nuclear war, without disclosing
the risks or obtaining consent.123 The matter never reached the appellate
courts, but the district court concluded that the involuntary and misleading
nature of the intrusion shocked the conscience and violated the right to bodily
integrity protected by due process.124
The Sixth Circuit applied this case law125 to hold that the Flint water
crisis gave rise to plausible substantive due process violations of the right to
bodily integrity.126 “In providing a tainted life-necessity and falsely assuring
the public about its potability, government officials ‘strip[ped] the very
essence of personhood’ from those who consumed the water.”127 With this,
the court announced a new element to protected personhood and bodily
integrity in constitutional law: water.
The court did acknowledge its prior holding that there is “no
fundamental right to water service.”128 But this prior holding now seems
limited to the context of government water providers shutting off residential
water service for nonpayment, with notice and other procedural due process
protections.129 More broadly, the court elucidated that “the Constitution does
not guarantee a right to live in a contaminant-free, healthy environment.”130
Certainly not in an abstract sense, and not if the right requires restricting the
lawful exercise of other private rights. But when the pollution contaminating
our bodies and damaging our health results from government actions,
without consent, the court’s opinion says our constitutional rights
are violated. 131
122
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The Sixth Circuit’s bold due process holding is amplified by its
dismantling of the state actors’ qualified immunity. Qualified immunity
creates a circular defense to a § 1983 suit claiming damages for a violation
of constitutional rights. Government officials are generally immune from
such suits when their performance of discretionary duties “does not violate
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.”132 In effect, this means
the government actor not only must have violated a constitutional right, but
must have done so when a reasonable official would have adequate notice of
the violation of constitutional rights.133 Notice is fundamental for any liability
regime, and state actors must have fair warning that their conduct was
unconstitutional to lose their qualified immunity.134 But this creates a
chicken-and-egg problem for advancing due process protections in new
circumstances. Without a prior case directly on point, plaintiffs have a high
bar of notice to enforce substantive due process protections against qualified
immunity.135 The Sixth Circuit said this bar was met in the Flint water crisis:
“If ever there was an egregious violation of the right to bodily integrity, this
is the case.”136 And with that, the majority gifted to future litigants bringing
similar due process claims the notice for defendants that the dissent would
have wanted.137
Clearing the doctrinal hurdles of a § 1983 suit alleging a substantive
due process violation of the right to bodily integrity is a tremendous legacy
for the Flint resident plaintiffs. Guertin has already opened doors for new
cases in environmental justice and beyond.138 For the Flint plaintiffs, the
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federal court victory in Guertin was followed by a similar vindication of
fundamental property and liberty rights in the Michigan Supreme Court.139
Guertin and subsequent federal cases considered holding liable
approximately twenty state and local officials, including the current and
former governors, for constitutional violations of the right to bodily
integrity.140 Some of the Guertin defendants were also part of a recent
settlement with Flint residents pending approval and administration in
federal court.141
D. Holding the EPA Accountable for Inaction
The § 1983 cases for violations of the right to bodily integrity provide
justice and remedies against individual state actors that caused the Flint
water crisis. But as discussed above, the Flint water crisis happened in part
due to the EPA’s direct involvement and lack of enforcement. Justice for
Flint includes accountability for federal inaction.142 The Flint residents
wanted to hold the United States accountable for the negligent actions and
inactions of the EPA.143
The Flint residents’ only legal tool for getting compensation from the
United States for the EPA’s negligence or other alleged torts is the Federal
Tort Claims Act (FTCA).144 The FTCA waives the United States’ sovereign
immunity and gives federal district courts jurisdiction over claims for
personal injury or death caused by the “negligent or wrongful act or
omission” of any government employees acting within the scope of their
employment.145 The threshold standard for the United States’ liability under
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the FTCA is “if a private person[] would be liable to the claimant in
accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.”146
The Flint residents relied on the Good Samaritan doctrine as the basis
for EPA liability for negligent action and inaction regarding the Flint water
crisis.147 The Good Samaritan doctrine creates tort liability for an actor who,
by affirmative acts, creates or assumes a duty to others and breaches that
duty.148 “Under this doctrine, when the government undertakes to act, it is
required to act carefully and will be liable for injuries proximately caused by
the failure to do so.”149
In two related federal district court opinions from the Eastern District
of Michigan, the court reviewed the EPA’s actions and inactions in the Flint
water crisis and determined that the Flint plaintiffs had sufficiently
demonstrated that the EPA was negligent in its undertaking.150 Pursuant to
the Good Samaritan doctrine, the courts further found that the EPA owed a
duty to the people of Flint, that Flint residents were harmed because of their
reliance on the EPA, and that the EPA’s failure to exercise reasonable care
increased the risk of harm to Flint.151
The United States has a powerful defense to this liability under the
FTCA called the “discretionary function exception.” The defense exempts
“[a]ny claim . . . based upon the exercise or performance [of,] or the failure
to exercise or perform[,] a discretionary function or duty on the part of a
federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the
discretion involved be abused.”152 If the plaintiffs’ claim falls within this
discretionary function exception, the court lacks jurisdiction and must leave
the matter to the executive branch or legislature. This protects the separation
of powers and prevents “judicial ‘second-guessing’ of legislative and
administrative decisions grounded in social, economic, and political policy
through the medium of an action in tort.”153
The Supreme Court has a two-step test to determine whether the
discretionary function exception bars federal court jurisdiction.154 First, the
146
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agency action must have been discretionary, as opposed to specifically
prescribed or mandated by statute or other authority.155 If the action was
discretionary, the second step of the test asks “whether that judgment is of
the kind that the discretionary function exception was designed to shield.”156
If so, the court lacks jurisdiction. In this way, the discretionary function
exception shields “governmental actions and decisions based on
considerations of public policy” from tort law.157 Further, there is a “strong
presumption” that the second step is satisfied upon finding the first
step satisfied.158
The EPA took various actions and failed to take other specific actions
pursuant to the SDWA, some of which were clearly discretionary. But the
court did not allow step one to steamroll step two of the discretionary
function exemption. Instead, the court found that the EPA’s failure to warn
Flint citizens of the unsafe water and its negligence in response to citizen
complaints did not entail the kind of judgment that the discretionary function
exception was designed to shield.159
The district court’s decisions to allow the FTCA claims against the
United States and reject the discretionary function exception have not been
substantively reviewed by an appellate court at the time of publication of this
Essay. The district court is continuing to hear FTCA claims in consolidated
litigation.160 While this is a preliminary victory and the district court opinions
are not precedent, the Flint residents have vanquished another doctrinal
hurdle in their successful complaint against the United States.
CONCLUSION
The legal developments in the wake of the Flint water crisis are still
unfolding, and the crisis itself in many ways continues. Many of the cases
discussed in this Essay are ongoing. Future judges will decide if the Flint
water crisis was analogous to other environmental injustices and whether
these precedents apply to the disputes of future litigants. But the Flint
residents have already changed their roles in the Flint water crisis from
political victims to legal victors. And they have given other communities and
individuals new precedents to do the same.
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